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Abstract—Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) can effectively improve the spectrum efficiency and alleviate the spectrum scarcity, by
allowing unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to access the licensed spectrum of primary users (PUs) opportunistically. Cooperative
spectrum sharing is a new promising paradigm to provide necessary incentives for both PUs and SUs in dynamic spectrum access.
The key idea is that SUs relay the traffic of PUs in exchange for the access time on the PUs’ licensed spectrum. In this paper, we
formulate the cooperative spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs as a two-sided market, and study the market
equilibrium under both complete and incomplete information. First, we characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the
market equilibrium. We analytically show that there may exist multiple market equilibria, among which there is always a unique Pareto-
optimal equilibrium for PUs (called PU-Optimal-EQ), in which every PU achieves a utility no worse than in any other equilibrium.
Then, we show that under complete information, the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium PU-Optimal-EQ can always be achieved
despite the competition among PUs; whereas, under incomplete information, the PU-Optimal-EQ may not be achieved due to the
mis-representations of SUs (in reporting their private information). Regarding this, we further study the worse-case equilibrium for PUs,
and characterize a Robust equilibrium for PUs (called PU-Robust-EQ), which provides every PU a guaranteed utility under all possible
mis-representation behaviors of SUs. Numerical results show that in a typical network where the number of PUs and SUs are different,
the performance gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g., less than 10% in the simulations).
Index Terms—Cooperative Spectrum Sharing, Game Theory, Two-Sided Matching, Market Equilibrium
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Wireless spectrum is becoming increasingly congested
and scarce with the explosive development of wireless
devices and services. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is
a promising approach to increase the spectrum efficiency
and alleviate the spectrum scarcity, by allowing unli-
censed secondary users (SUs) to opportunistically access
to the spectrum licensed to primary users (PUs) [1]-[4].
To successfully implement DSA, it is important to offer
necessary incentives for PUs to open their spectrum for
SUs’ utilizations, and for SUs to access the PUs’ spectrum
despite of the potential costs [5]-[7].
Cooperative spectrum sharing (also called cooperative
spectrum leasing [8]) has been proposed as an effective
approach to offer crucial incentives for both PUs and
SUs in DSA [8]-[14]. The basic idea is that SUs relay
the traffic of PUs in exchange for the opportunities to
access the PUs’ licensed spectrum. With the cooperative
spectrum sharing, PUs can increase their transmission
rates through the cooperative relay of SUs, and SUs can
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Fig. 1. Illustration of cooperative spectrum sharing.
obtain transmission opportunities on the PUs’ licensed
spectrum. Thus, it will lead to a win-win situation
for PUs and SUs.1 Figure 1 illustrates an example of
cooperative spectrum sharing between 3 PUs and 4 SUs,2
where each SU i cooperates with PU i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
and SU 4 does not cooperate with any PU. SUs relay
traffic for intended PUs according to a pre-defined co-
operative protocol, such as amplified-and forward (AF)
and decode-and-forward (DF). Hence, each cooperation
frame is divided into 3 phases: in Phase I, each PU i’s
transmitter (PTi) broadcasts its messages to its receiver
(PRi) as well as to the cooperating SU i; in Phase II,
each SU i’s transmitter (STi) forwards the received PU
i’s signal to the PU i’s receiver PRi; and in Phase III,
each SU i transmits its own messages (from STi to SRi)
1. Cooperative spectrum sharing can also be viewed as an enhanced
cooperative relay scheme. From the perspective of cooperative relays
(e.g., D2D relays in 5G system [28]), it can provide the necessary
incentives for SUs to relay the traffic of PUs.
2. Here each PU i is a dedicated transceiver pair {PTi, PRi}, and
each SU i is also a dedicated transceiver pair {STi, SRi}.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
03
76
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
3 A
pr
 20
16
2on the PU i’s spectrum.
While there are some prior works considering the co-
operative spectrum sharing problem [8]-[14], all of these
works focused on the interactions between one PU and
one or multiple SUs. Our work advances the research in
this area by analyzing the interaction between multiple
PUs and multiple SUs as shown in Figure 1. This more
practical scenario is significantly more challenging to
analyze, as not only SUs compete with each other for the
PUs’ licensed spectrums, but PUs also compete with each
other for the SUs’ collaborations. An important question
arising in such a multi-PU multi-SU scenario is:
• Which PU cooperates with which SU, and what is the
resource exchange (i.e., the PU’s spectrum access time
reward and the SU’s relay effort) between them?
As the traditional matching problem usually studies the
binary pairing of users without considering the resource
exchange details, our problem is actually an extended
matching problem.
1.2 Solution and Contribution
In this work, we formulate the cooperative spectrum
sharing problem between multiple PUs and multiple SUs
as a two-sided matching market, with PUs as one side
and SUs as the other side. A PU is matched to an SU
means that the PU cooperates with the SU under certain
resource exchange agreement. Accordingly, a matching
between PUs and SUs defines not only their collabo-
rative relationships, but also the resource exchange be-
tween each pair of matched PU and SU. An equilibrium is
defined as a stable matching, from which neither PUs nor
SUs have the incentive to deviate. For such a two-sided
market, we want to answer the following questions:
• what is the market equilibrium, and which equilibrium
will emerge in different information scenarios?
Note that both problems are challenging due to the
following reasons. First, finding the stable matching of a
two-sided matching market is well-known an NP-hard
problem, and thus mathematically intractable. Second,
in some two-sided matching markets including the one
in this paper, there may be an infinite number of market
equilibria, and analytically characterizing these market
equilibria is challenging. Third, different information
scenarios (depending on how much information that
PUs know) may lead to different market equilibria.
Characterizing the equilibrium in different information
scenarios is also a challenging problem.
We will study the market equilibrium in two different
information scenarios systematically: complete and incom-
plete information. In the former case, each PU knows
the whole network information, while in the latter case,
each PU knows only its local network information (see
Section 3.F for details). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper that systematically studies cooperative
spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple
SUs by using the matching theory. The main results and
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Two-sided Market Model and Solution Technique:
We formulate the cooperative spectrum sharing be-
tween multiple PUs and multiple SUs as a two-sided
matching market, and comprehensively study the
market equilibrium (stable matching) in both com-
plete and incomplete information scenarios.
• Equilibrium Analysis: We characterize the sufficient
and necessary conditions for market equilibrium,
and show that there may be an infinite number
of market equilibria. We further show that these
is always a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for
PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ) , in which every PU achieves a
utility no worse than that in any other equilibrium.
• Complete and Incomplete Information: We show
that under complete information, the unique Pareto-
optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ) can
always be achieved despite of the competition
among PUs. Under incomplete information, how-
ever, the PU-Optimal-EQ may not be achieved due to
the mis-representations of SUs. To this end, we char-
acterize a Robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-
EQ), which provides every PU a guaranteed utility
under all possible mis-representation behaviors of
SUs.
• Performance Evaluation: Numerical studies show
that each PU’s utility increases (or decreases) with
the number of SUs (or PUs) in both PU-Optimal-
EQ and PU-Robust-EQ. In many practical network
scenarios where the numbers of PUs and SUs are
often different, the performance gap between PU-
Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g.,
less than 10% in the simulations). This implies that
the equilibrium performance depends more on the
market structure than on the information scenario.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review the related literature. In Section 3,
we present the system model. In Section 4, we provide
the two-sided market formulation. In Section 5, we use
a simplified example to illustrate the equilibrium. In
Section 6, we study the equilibria of a general model.
In Section 7, we show which equilibria will emerge in
different information scenarios. We provide numerical
results in Section 8, and finally conclude in Section 9.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Cooperative Spectrum Sharing
Most prior work on cooperative spectrum sharing fo-
cused on the interactions between one PU and one or
multiple SUs [8]-[14]. Some assumed that the PU has
complete information of SUs (e.g., SUs’ relay channel
gains and sensitivities to power consumption) [8]-[11],
while others considered that the PU has limited infor-
mation about SUs [12], [13]. These works used either
Stackelberg game or contract theory to model and ana-
lyze the problem. However, both approaches are difficult
to be extended to the scenario of multiple PUs and
multiple SUs. A closely related paper that considers the
3interactions between multiple PUs and multiple SUs is
[14], where authors proposed a distributed algorithm to
reach a stable matching that is weak Pareto optimal. Our
work generalizes the result of [14] in the following way:
(i) we analytically show that there are multiple (possibly
infinite) stable matchings including the Pareto optimal
one studied in [14], (ii) we characterize the necessary and
sufficient conditions for all possible stable matchings,
and (iii) we propose distributed algorithms converging
to different stable matchings, given different information
available to PUs.
B. Two-sided Matching Market
In economics, two-sided matching market is an effective
framework and widely-used for studying the interac-
tions between two disjoint player sets in a two-sided
market setting. In such markets, the matching theory
can systematically capture not only the cooperative in-
teractions between users in different sides, but also the
competitive interactions between users on the same side.
Most early results in this area focused on the matching
under complete information, without considering the
incentive issues under incomplete information. The first
basic two-sided market models were proposed by Gale
and Shapley [15]. Shapley and Shubik [16] and Thomp-
son [17] studied the more general models with additive
and transferable utilities. Crawford and Knoer [18], [19]
studied the two-sided labor models with nontransfer-
able utilities. Some later results [20], [21] studied the
incentive issue under incomplete information. Our work
differs from the above works: we consider not only the
binary matching decision, but also the detailed resource
exchange between each pair of matched users.
It is notable that our analysis techniques and engi-
neering insights are applicable to other wireless network
problems that can be modeled as a two-sided market.
The equilibrium obtained in this paper provides a quite
general characterization of the network stable outcome
in a wide range of large complicated networks.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a DSA network with a setM , {1, ...,M} of
PUs and a set N , {1, ..., N} of SUs. Each PU m ∈M (or
SU n ∈ N ) is a dedicated transceiver pair {PTm,PRm}
(or {STn,SRn}) as illustrated in Figure 1. A PU has the
exclusive usage right of a licensed frequency band (with
a normalized bandwidth). We assume that the frequency
bands of different PUs are non-overlapping, and thus there
is no interference among PUs’ transmissions. As in many
existing literature [8]-[14], we further assume that there
exists a common control channel for the communications
and interactions between PUs and SUs.
On one hand, PUs may suffer from low transmission
rates or high outage probabilities due to the poor chan-
nel conditions between their transmitters and receivers
caused by, for example, the long-distance attenuation,
shadowing, and fading. Thus, PUs want to employ
Phase I Phase IIIPhase II
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Fig. 2. Frame structure of cooperative spectrum sharing.
SUs as relays to improve their transmission rates. On
the other hand, SUs need spectrum resources for their
own transmissions, but cannot access the PUs’ licensed
spectrum without PUs’ permissions. Thus, we expect a
win-win situation where SUs relay PUs’ traffic in order
to get free access time on the PUs’ spectrums.
To facilitate the practical implementation, we assume
that one PU can choose at most one SU to relay its traffic
at a particular time (but can change the relaying SU at
different time). This is motivated by existing results that
choosing the most appropriate relay is usually sufficient
to achieve the optimal (or close-to-optimal) performance
[22]. Moreover, this can be implemented more easily in
practice, as there is no need to consider the coordination
among multiple relays. We further assume that each SU
can serve at most one PU at a particular time (but can
change the serving PU at different time). Therefore, a
key question arising in such a scenario is: who will relay
whose traffic, and how?
3.1 Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Protocol
We first consider the cooperative spectrum sharing pro-
tocol between a particular PU m and SU n (assuming SU
n cooperates with PU m). As shown in Figure 1, each
cooperation period (frame) includes 3 phases: Phases I
and II for the cooperative communication between PU
m and SU n (each with a fixed period of Tm/2),3 and
Phase III for SU n’s own transmission (with a period of
tmn ). Thus, the total length of one cooperation frame is
Tm + t
m
n . For clarity, we illustrate the structure of such a
3-phase transmission frame in Figure 2.
Obviously, the cooperative communication protocol
used in Phases I and II plays an important role in the
cooperative spectrum sharing. In this paper, we adopt
the widely-used Amplified-and-Forward (AF) protocol [23]
in Phases I and II.4 For the analytical convenience, we
assume the AWGN channel in the physical links. Note
that the channel model can be easily extended to fast fad-
ing channels (e.g., Rayleigh channel), by considering the
average transmission rate or average outage probability.
We further assume that each pair of transmitter and
receiver know the channel gain between them through,
for example, measuring the received signal strength.
For convenience, we list the key notations in Table 1,
where m is the PU index and n is the SU index. The
meaning of each notation will be explained later.
3. The total cooperative transmission period Tm is determined by
the physical layer specifications. Different PUs may have different Tm.
4. Note that our analysis can be easily applied to other coopera-
tive protocols (e.g., Decode-and-Forward and Compress-and-Forward)
with minor modifications on the utility functions of PUs and SUs.
4TABLE 1
Key Notations
Tm PU m’s cooperative communication time (Phases I and II);
Cn SU n’s sensitivity of unit power consumption;
Gm PU m’s direct channel (PTm to PRm) gain;
Gn(m) SU n’s direct channel (STn to SRn) gain on PU m’s band;
Gm,n 1st relay channel (PTm to STn) gain of PU m and SU n;
Gn,m 2nd relay channel (STn to PRm) gain of PU m and SU n;
pmn The relay power of SU n for PU m’s traffic;
tmn The dedicated access time on PU m’s band for SU n;
Πmn The utility of PU m when cooperating with SU n;
∆mn The utility of SU n when cooperating with PU m;
3.2 PU and SU Modeling
We now define the PU’s and SU’s utilities achieved in the
cooperative spectrum sharing. Suppose SU n cooperates
with PU m in the following way: SU n relays the PU m’s
signal with a power pmn , and PU m rewards a dedicated
access time tmn on its spectrum to SU n.
With the AF protocol, the PU m’s transmitter PTm
broadcasts the data (with unit power) in Phase I, and
SU n normalizes the received signal rn,m by a factor√
pmn /|rn,m| and forwards it to PRm in Phase II. The
receiver PRm combines the received signals in Phases
I and II with a maximal ratio combining. Essentially, we
can view the transmission during Phases I and II as a
single-input, two-output complex Gaussian noise chan-
nel. Accordingly, the transmission rate during Phases I
and II achieved from i.i.d. complex Gaussian inputs is
given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem [23]:
Rmn =
1
2 · log(1 + κmd + κmn ), (1)
where κmd is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on the PU
m’s direct channel (PTm to PRm), and κmn is the SNR on
the relay channel of SU n. For convenience, we normalize
the PU’s direct transmission power into 1. Then, we have
κmd =
G2m
σ2 , where Gm is the channel gain of the PU m’s
direct channel and σ2 is the noise power, and
κmn =
pmn G
2
m,nG
2
n,m
pmn G
2
n,m+G
2
m,n+σ
2 · 1σ2 , (2)
where Gm,n is the channel gain of the channel between
PTm and STn (called the 1st relay channel), and Gn,m is
the channel gain of the channel between STn and PRm
(called the 2nd relay channel). Obviously, the SNR κmn
increases with the SU’s relay power pmn .
Since the cooperative period occupies TmTm+tmn fraction
of the total frame, PU m’s effective transmission rate dur-
ing the entire frame (when cooperating with SU n) is
R˜mn =
Tm
Tm+tmn
· 12 · log(1 + κmd + κmn ). (3)
We define PU m’s utility as the increase of its transmis-
sion rate when cooperating with an SU n, i.e.,
Πmn , R˜mn −Rmd = Tm·log(1+κ
m
d +κ
m
n )
2·(Tm+tmn ) −R
m
d , (4)
where Rmd = log(1 + κ
m
d ) = log(1 + G
2
m/σ
2) is PU m’s
direct transmission rate without any relay.
Similarly, the SU n’s transmission rate in Phase III on
the PU m’s frequency band is given by [23]:
Rn(m) , log
(
1 +
G2n(m)
σ2
)
, (5)
where Gn(m) is the SU n’s direct channel (STn to SRn)
gain on the PU m’s frequency band. Note that each SU n
may have different direct channel gains Gn(m) on differ-
ent PU m’s band, due to the frequency selective fading.
Moreover, there is no interference between SUs’ trans-
missions as they operate on non-overlapping bands.
Since the SU n’s transmission occupies t
m
n
Tm+tmn
fraction
of each frame, its equivalent transmission rate during the
entire frame (when cooperating with PU m) is
R˜n(m) =
tmn
Tm+tmn
· log (1 + G2n(m)σ2 ). (6)
The SU n’s total energy consumption during the entire
frame (when cooperating with PU m) is
Sn(m) , Tm2 · pmn + tmn · 1, (7)
where the first term is due to relaying PU m’s traffic,
and the second term is due to SU n’s own traffic (with
a normalized unit transmission power).
We define the SU n’s utility (when cooperating with
PU m) as the difference between the achieved transmis-
sion rate and the incurred power cost, denoted by
∆mn , R˜n(m) − CnSn(m)Tm+tmn =
tmn (Rn(m)−Cn)−pmn CnTm2
Tm+tmn
, (8)
where Sn(m)Tm+tmn is the average transmission power, and Cn
is its sensitivity for unit power consumption.
4 TWO-SIDED MARKET FORMULATION
Before the detailed modeling of the spectrum sharing
market, we first provide the definition of a basic two-
sided matching market (also called two-sided market).
Definition 1 (Two-sided Matching Market): A two-sided
matching market is a market consisting of two disjoint
sets of users, where an user on one side can be matched
with only one user on the other side.
A one-to-one (binary) matching (or just matching) in a
two-sided market is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Matching): A one-to-one matching be-
tween two disjoint sets M and N can be represented
by a one-to-one correspondence µ(·), where m ∈ M is
mapped to n ∈ N (i.e., µ(m) = n) if and only if n is also
mapped to m (i.e., µ(n) = m).
For notational convenience, we will also write µ(m) as
µm and µ(n) as µn when there is no confusion caused.
4.1 Two-sided Market Modeling
In our model, each PU has different preferences over SUs
depending on the locations of SUs, and wants to select
the most efficient SU as relay; each SU also has different
preferences over PUs depending on its channel gains on
PUs’ bands, and want to obtain the dedicated spectrum
access time from the most “generous” PU. Thus, we can
5PU m
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the key network information.
formulate this model as a two-sided market, with PUs on
one side and SUs on the other side. A PU is matched
to an SU (or equivalently, an SU is matched to a PU)
means that the PU cooperates with the SU, that is, the SU
relays traffic for the PU, and the PU rewards dedicated
spectrum access time to the SU. Clearly, in this two-
sided market, we need to consider not only the binary
matching between PUs and SUs (given in Definition 2),
but also the detailed resource exchange between each
pair of matched PU and SU.5
More specifically, for each pair of matched PU and SU,
the PU’s and SU’s utilities depend not only on the SU’s
relay power (in Phase II), but also on the PU’s spectrum
access time reward (in Phase III). In addition, an increase
in one user’s utility will lead to a (not necessarily the
same amount of) decrease in the other’s utility in the
matching pair. Therefore, we face a two-sided market
with transferrable utility, where each user’s utility (or
preference) in a given matching pair is not fixed, but
depends on the resource exchange with the matched user
(i.e., the access time reward and relay power).
Based on the above discussion, we address the follow-
ing matching problem for the proposed market:
Question 1 (Relay-Assignment): What kind of matching
pairs will emerge from users’ strategic interactions?
Question 2 (Resource-Exchange): What is the detailed
resource exchange (i.e., the access time and relay power)
for each pair of matched PU and SU?
4.2 Market Equilibrium – Stable Matching
Now we consider the above matching problem from
a game-theoretical analysis. Note that game theory is
applicable to our model, as PUs and SUs are rational
and self-interested, and always want to maximize their
own utilities. Furthermore, one user’s decision will affect
others’ utilities and decisions. To solve the matching
problem, it would be useful to understand what kind
of matching will be “broken” (and thus unstable).
Definition 3 (Unstable Matching): A matching will be
broken if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) There exist a PU and an SU who are not matched
to each other but both prefer to be;
(b) There exists a PU or an SU with a negative utility
in the existing matching.
5. Since each binary matching is associated with a set of resource ex-
changes (each for a pair of matched users), we will use the terminology
“matching” to denote both (i) the binary matching between PUs and
SUs, and (ii) the resource exchange for each pair of matched users.
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tion scenarios. Under complete information, each PU m
knows all network information (in the rectangle). Under
incomplete information, each PU m knows its local infor-
mation (in the blue triangle).
In (a), the PU and the SU would discard their current
partners and match to each other. In (b), the PU or SU
would remain single rather than stick to the current
partner. Thus, a broken matching is “unstable”.
As long as a matching is not broken, we call it a stable
matching, or equivalently, a market equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Market Equilibrium): A market equilib-
rium is a stable matching, where no user can improve
its utility via unilateral deviation (i.e., choosing another
partner or changing resource exchange details).
Based on the above definitions, we can rewrite the
matching problem (given in Questions 1 and 2) into the
following equivalent question: what market equilibrium
(stable matching) will emerge in the two-sided matching
market? Notice that there are many important factors af-
fecting the market equilibrium realization, one of which
is: which side of the market has the market power to
propose cooperation offers to the other side [15]. In
this paper, we consider a PU-proposal market, where
PUs have the authority to propose offers.6 That is, each
PU decides which SU to select and what time reward
and relay power request to/from that SU, and each
SU passively accepts or rejects the received offer. The
study of a PU-proposal market is motivated by the fact
that PUs usually have more market power than SUs
in cooperative spectrum sharing, since their number is
limited and they own the scarce spectrum licenses.
4.3 Network Information
In addition to who are the proposers, the information
scenario also affects the equilibrium. That is, which
equilibrium will eventually appear also depends on how
much network information are known to PUs. In our
6. Note that the analysis for the PU-proposal market can be directly
extended to the SU-proposal market, where SUs propose offers to
PUs, and PUs simply accept or reject the received offers.
6TABLE 2
Information Scenarios and Associated Market Equilibria.
Information Scenario Each PU m’s Knowledge Equilibrium Property Section No.
Complete {Gm, Gn(m), Gm,n, Gn,m}n∈N ,m∈M PU-Optimal-EQ Pareto-optimal for PUs Section 6
Incomplete {Gm, Gn(m), Gm,n, Gn,m}n∈N PU-Robust-EQ Guaranteed for PUs Section 7
model, the key network information mainly include7
(a) Gm: the direct channel gain of each PU m;
(b) Gn(m): the direct channel gain of each SU n on each
PU m’s spectrum band;
(c) Gm,n and Gn,m: the relay channel gains between
each pair of PU m and SU n.
For convenience, we illustrate the network information
(between PU m and SU n) in Figure 3, where the label
in each link denotes the associated channel gain.
In this work, we consider two different information
scenarios: complete information and incomplete informa-
tion, depending on how much network information the
PUs know. Specifically, in the complete information sce-
nario, each PU m is assumed to know the whole network
information, i.e., {Gm, Gn(m), Gm,n, Gn,m}n∈N ,m∈M. In
the incomplete information scenario, each PU m is as-
sumed to know its local network information only, i.e.,
{Gm, Gn(m), Gm,n, Gn,m}n∈N , but not those of other PUs.
Note that the incomplete information scenario is more
practical, as a PU can use reference signal strength (RSS)
to detect the channel gains to all potential SUs, yet it is
hard for him to estimate other PUs’ channel gains. For
convenience, we summarize these information scenarios
in Figure 4.8
In what follows, we will characterize the sufficient
and necessary conditions for the market equilibrium
(of the PU-proposal market) in Section 6, and study
which equilibria will emerge in complete and incomplete
information scenarios in Section 7. For convenience, we
summarize these information scenarios and the associ-
ated market equilibria in Table 2.
5 A SIMPLIFIED MODEL
Before studying the market equilibrium in the general
model, we first consider a simplified model where the
access time reward offered by each PU (in Phase III) and
the relay power contributed by each SU (in Phase II)
are fixed. Thus, we only need to consider the binary
matching between PUs and SUs (i.e., the relay assign-
ment problem defined in Question 1).9
Note that we use this simple model to illustrate some
key properties of the proposed matching market, which
7. Notice that we view the cooperative transmission time Tm of each
PU m and the power sensitivity Cn of each SU n as public information.
This is because these parameters are usually pre-defined and keep
unchanged in a long time, given the types of PUs or SUs.
8. We further study a strongly incomplete information scenario in the
online technical report [29], where each PU m does not even know
each SU n’s channel gain, i.e., Gn(m). The equilibrium analysis for
such a stronger incomplete information scenario is similar.
9. This model is similar to the two-sided market model in [15], [20],
and our results in this section also refer to those in [15], [20].
is essential for understanding the general model in Sec-
tions 6 and 7. Moreover, this simplified model is useful
for the network scenario with inflexible relay protocols
or static physical layer specifications, where secondary
access time and relay power cannot be freely adjusted.
5.1 Users’ Preferences
With fixed time reward and relay power, each user’s
utility for each particular partner on the other side
is fixed. Thus, the model degenerates to a two-sided
matching problem without utility transferring (similar to
the Marriage model considered in [15]).
Let tm denote the (fixed) spectrum access time re-
warded by PU m for any SU collaborating with him,
and pn the (fixed) relaying power offered by SU n for
any PU collaborating with him. The preferences of a PU
m can be represented by an ordered list in the decreasing
preference, P (m), on the SUs,10
P (m) = {n1, n2, ..., np}, (9)
subject to (i) Πmni(tm, pni) ≥ Πmnj (tm, pnj ) if i < j,
and (ii) Πmn (tm, pn) ≥ 0 for any SU n ∈ P (m), and
Πmn′(tm, pn′) < 0 for any SU n
′ /∈ P (m). Here Πmn (·) is the
PU m’s utility defined in (4). The first condition means
that PU m prefers an SU who provides him a higher
utility, and the second condition means that PU m never
selects an SU who brings him a negative utility.
Similarly, the preference list of an SU n on the PUs can
be represented by
Q(n) = {m1,m2, ...,mq}, (10)
subject to (i) ∆min (tmi , pn) ≥ ∆mjn (tmj , pn) if i < j, and
(ii) ∆mn (tm, pn) ≥ 0 if m ∈ Q(n), and ∆m
′
n (tm′ , pn) < 0
m′ /∈ Q(n). Here ∆mn (·) is the SU n’s utility in (8).
5.2 An Example and Its Equilibrium
We provide an example to illustrate the equilibria under
the fixed preferences.11 Recall that a binary matching be-
tween PUs and SUs is represented by a correspondence
µ(·), where µm = n (or equivalently, µn = m) means PU
m is matched to SU n, and µm = ∅ or µn = ∅ means
PU m or SU n remains single (i.e., not engaged in the
cooperative spectrum sharing).
Example 1: Consider a two-sided market with 3 PUs
(m1,m2,m3) and 3 SUs (n1, n2, n3) with preferences:
10. The number of elements in set P (m) could be smaller than N ,
that is, PU m is only interested in a subset of SUs.
11. The complete equilibrium analysis for such a simplified model
(with the fixed preferences) can be referred to [29].
7PUs’ preferences SUs’ preferences
P (m1) n1, n2, n3 Q(n1) m2, m3, m1
P (m2) n2, n3, n1 Q(n2) m3, m1, m2
P (m3) n3, n1, n2 Q(n3) m1, m2, m3
According to the definition of equilibrium in Defini-
tion 4, we can easily obtain the following three equilibria
µa, µb, and µc for the above example:
Equilibria µa(·) µb(·) µc(·)
PUs m1 m2 m3 m1 m2 m3 m1 m2 m3
SUs n1 n2 n3 n2 n3 n1 n3 n1 n2
Let us check the feasibility of the above equilibria
using the definition of market equilibrium. Take the
equilibrium µb as an example, where PU m1 is matched
to SU n2, PU m2 is matched to SU n3, and PU m3 is
matched to SU n1. We can easily find that PU m1 prefers
SU n1 than its current partner SU n2 (as Πm1n2 < Π
m1
n1 ),
but SU n1 has no incentive to discard its current partner
PU m3 and pair with PU m1 (as ∆m3n1 > ∆
m1
n1 ). Similarly,
PU m2 prefers SU n2 than its current partner SU n3, but
SU n2 has no incentive to discard its current partner PU
m1 and pair with PU m2. PU m3 prefers SU n3 than its
current partner SU n1, but SU n1 has no incentive to
discard its current partner PU m2 and pair with PU m3.
Thus, there does not exist a pair of PU and SU who are
not matched to each other but both prefer to be. 
6 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Now we characterize the market equilibrium in a general
model where the access time reward and the relay power
are not fixed. In this case, each user’s utility (with a par-
ticular partner at the other side) is no longer fixed, but
changes with the resource exchange (i.e., the access time
reward and relay power) between them. Accordingly,
the preference list of each user depends on its current
resource exchanges with users at the other side. Thus, we
need to consider not only the binary matching between
PUs and SUs (i.e., the relay assignment problem defined
in Question 1), but also the resource exchange between
each pair of matched users (i.e., the resource exchange
problem defined Question 2).
In what follows, we will start by defining the utility
transfer function, which captures the interaction within
each matching pair. Then we characterize the necessary
and sufficient conditions for market equilibrium. We
will show that there are multiple (infinite number) of
market equilibria. In the next section, we will further
study which specific equilibrium will actually emerge in
different information scenarios.
6.1 Utility Transfer Function - UTF
Suppose that PU m is matched to SU n. We first study
how their utilities change with the access time reward
and the relay power.
Recall in the PU-proposal market, PUs propose the
offers and SUs decide whether to accept or not. Let δmn
denote the SU n’s highest utility from all other PUs’
TABLE 3
Important Notations in Section 6
fmn (·) PU m’s maximal utility given the matched SU’s utility;
gmn (·) SU n’s maximal utility given the matched PU’s utility;
µn The PU matched to SU n;
µm The SU matched to PU m;
δn The SU n’s achieved utility in a given matching;
δ¯n The SU n’s highest achievable utility in a matching;
δn The SU n’s lowest acceptable utility in a matching;
offers (except PU m’s) and from remaining single (not
matched to any PU), called reservation utility of SU n
(towards PU m).12 Then, to attract SU n’s cooperation,
PU m has to offer SU n a utility no less than δmn . Thus,
the PU m’s maximum utility is given by
Πm∗n = max{pmn ,tmn }
Πmn (p
m
n , t
m
n )
s.t. ∆mn (p
m
n , t
m
n ) ≥ δmn ,
(11)
where Πmn (pmn , tmn ) is PU m’s utility defined in (4),
∆mn (p
m
n , t
m
n ) is SU n’s utility defined in (8). Notice that
the constraint must be tight at the optimality. This im-
plies that the variable tmn (or pmn ) can be rewritten as a
function of pmn (or tmn ), and thus the problem (11) can be
transformed into a single-variable optimization problem.
Hence, problem (11) can be solved efficiently using many
one-dimension exhaustive search methods. We denote
the computational complexity of solving (11) as ρ.
It is easy to check that the PU m’s maximal utility Πm∗n
given by (11) is strictly decreasing in SU n’s reservation
utility δmn . Thus, we can write Πm∗n as a decreasing
function of δmn :
Πm∗n , fmn (δmn ).
We refer to fmn (·) as the Utility Transfer Function (UTF).
Furthermore, we denote
gmn (·) , fmn (−1)(·)
as the Inverse Utility Transfer Function (IUTF), i.e.,
pimn = f
m
n (δ
m
n ) if and only if δmn = gmn (pimn ). Note that
fmn (δ
m
n ) denotes the PU m’s maximal utility when giving
SU n a utility δmn , and gmn (pimn ) denotes the SU n’s maximal
utility when giving PU m a utility pimn .13
To facilitate the understanding of the later analysis, we
list some important notations in Table 3.
6.2 Sufficient & Necessary Conditions
Now we study the sufficient and necessary conditions
for an equilibrium. The optimization problem (11) shows
that the PU m’s maximal utility depends on SU n’s utility
δmn , so does the optimal access time tmn and relay power
pmn . Thus, the resource exchange problem in Question 2
is equivalent to the following utility division problem:
12. Note that an SU n’s reservation utility is PU-dependent, i.e., δm1n
may be different from δm2n , as it is the SU’s highest utility from all but
one of the PUs.
13. An illustration of UTF is provided by Figure 6 in [29].
8what is the utility for each SU in a matching? This means
that we can rewrite a matching as
{(µn, δn), ∀n ∈ N}, (12)
where µn denotes the PU matched to SU n, and δn
denotes the SU n’s utility in the given matching.14 Ob-
viously, in such a matching, the utility of PU µn (i.e.,
the PU matched to SU n) is fµnn (δn), which is PU µn’s
maximum achievable utility computed by (11). Note that
the utility is zero for an unmatched SU n (with µn = ∅)
or PU m (with m 6= µn,∀n ∈ N ).
In what follows, we will present the lower-bound and
upper-bound of each δn (for the matched PU µn and
SU n), such that none of PUs and SUs has an incentive
to break the current matching. To achieve this, for each
pair of matched PU µn and SU n: (i) PU µn (or SU n) has
no incentive to break the current matching by remaining
single, or by pairing with another SU (or PU), and (ii)
all PUs other than µn (or all SUs other than n) have no
incentives to discard their respective partners and pair
with SU n (or PU µn).
According to Definition 4, we first have the following
necessary conditions for an equilibrium.
Lemma 1: If {(µn, δn),∀n} is an equilibrium, then the
following conditions hold: for each SU n ∈ N ,
(IR) fµnn (δn) ≥ 0;
(IC) fµnn (δn) ≥ fµnk (δk), ∀k 6= n,
where µn denotes the PU matched to SU n.
The first condition is generally referred to as Individual
Rationality (IR), and the second condition is generally
referred to as Incentive Compatibility (IC). The proof fol-
lows directly from the definition of equilibrium: If the IR
condition is violated by a PU µn, then PU µn will discard
its partner (SU n) and remain single; If the IC condition
is violated by a PU µn, i.e., there exists another SU k 6= n
such that fµnn (δn) < f
µn
k (δk), then PU µn can get a better
utility by paring up with SU k instead.15
The IC and IR conditions for a PU µn ensure that PU
µn has no incentive to change its decision. We further
introduce the Competitive Compatibility (CC) condition for
PU µn, which ensures that no other PUs has the incentive
to compete with a PU µn (for SU n). Intuitively, the CC
condition for a PU µn (i.e., the PU matched to SU n)
means no other PU m can achieve a higher utility on SU
n than on its current partner SU µm. Formally,
Lemma 2: If {(µn, δn),∀n} is an equilibrium, then the
following condition holds: for each PU µn ∈M,16
(CC) fmµm(δµm) ≥ fmn (δn), ∀m 6= µn,
where µm denotes the SU matched to PU m.
The IR condition for a PU µn implies
fµnn (δn) ≥ 0⇒ δn ≤ gµnn (0),
14. Note we omit the superscript µn in δ
µn
n for simplicity of writing.
15. With a proper offer from PU µn (e.g., giving SU k a utility δk+,
where  is any infinitesimal positive number), SU k will also improve
its utility through the new pairing and thus will accept.
16. Note that fmµm (·) ≡ 0 if µm = ∅, which denotes the utility of PU
m when not engaging in any collaboration.
where gµnn (0) = fµnn
(−1)(0) is the maximum achievable
utility of SU n when leaving zero utility to PU µn. The
IC condition for a PU µn implies
fµnn (δn) ≥ fµnk (δk), ∀k 6= n
⇒ δn ≤ gµnn
(
fµnk (δk)
)
, ∀k 6= n
⇒ δn ≤ mink 6=n
{
gµnn
(
fµnk (δk)
)}
,
where gmn (x) = fmn
(−1)(x) is the SU n’s maximum
achievable utility when leaving a utility x to PU m. The
CC condition for a PU µn further implies
δn ≥ gmn
(
fmµm(δµm)
)
, ∀m 6= µn
⇒ δn ≥ max
m 6=µn
{
gmn
(
fmµm(δµm)
)}
.
Based on the above discussions, we can obtain the
lowest acceptable utility δn and the highest achievable utility
δn for an SU n in an equilibrium {(µ(n), δn),∀n}, i.e.,
δn , maxm6=µn
{
gmn
(
fmµm(δµm)
)
, 0
}
, (13)
δn , mink 6=n
{
gµnn
(
fµnk (δk)
)
, gµnn (0)
}
. (14)
Intuitively, PU µn cannot offer a utility δn lower than
δn to SU n, otherwise some other PU m 6= µn will have
the incentive to pair up with SU n (by offering SU n
a utility slightly higher than δn). This will make the
original matching broken. On the other hand, PU µn will
never offer a utility δn higher than δn to SU n, otherwise
PU µn would be better off by pairing up with an other
SU. This will also make the matching broken.
Therefore, we can rewrite the necessary conditions
in Lemma 1 more explicitly as follows: If a matching
{(µn, δn),∀n} is an equilibrium, the condition holds:
δn ≤ δn ≤ δn, ∀n ∈ N ,
where δn and δn are defined in (13) and (14), respectively.
The left inequality is due to the CC condition, and the
right inequality is due to the IC and IR conditions.
The next theorem shows the above conditions are not
only necessary, but also sufficient.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient & Necessary Condition): A
matching {(µn, δn),∀n} is an equilibrium, if and only if
δn ≤ δn ≤ δn, ∀n ∈ N .
Due to space limit, we put the detailed proof in [29].
6.3 Property of Equilibrium
To facilitate the characterization of equilibrium in differ-
ent information scenarios (in the next section), we first
show the following property for equilibrium.
Lemma 3 (Generalized Lattice Theorem): Given any
possible binary matching µ(·), if {(µn, δIn),∀n} and {(µn,
δIIn ),∀n} are equilibria, then the matching {(µn, δXn ),∀n}
with δXn = min(δIn, δIIn ) is also an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 can be seen as a generalization of the Lattice
Theorem proposed by Kunth [24] for the basic two-sided
matching (without utility transferring). By repeatedly
9applying Lemma 3 on any two equilibria, we will reach
the unique optimal equilibrium for PUs.
Theorem 2 (Optimality): There exists a Pareto-optimal
equilibrium {(µn, δ∗n),∀n} for PUs, where every PU
achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria. In
addition, {(µn, δ∗n),∀n} satisfies:17
δ∗n = δ
∗
n, ∀n ∈ N .
Theorem 2 not only shows the existence of the Pareto-
optimal equilibrium for PUs, but also suggests a method
to calculate the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs.
Specifically, given any feasible matching µ(·), we can
derive each SU’s utility (and the associated time reward
and relay power) under the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
by jointly solving the following function set:
δn = max
m 6=µn
{
gmn
(
fmµm(δµm)
)
, 0
}
, ∀n ∈ N . (15)
Obviously, if there is a unique solution for (15), it must
be the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. If there is no
solution for (15), the matching µ(·) is not feasible.
However, directly solving the above function set is dif-
ficult. Consider a single equation in the function set (say,
δn). To solve this equation, we first need to compute the
utilities of all PUs other than µn on their own matching
pairs, i.e., fmµm(δµm), ∀m 6= µn. Then, we need to compute
the SU n’s maximum achievable utility when giving
each PU m 6= µn a utility fmµm(δµm), i.e., gmn
(
fmµm(δµm)
)
,
∀m 6= µn. Finally, the SU n’s utility δn is the maximum of
the above computed maximum achievable utilities and
zero. Obviously, for this single equation, we need to
repeatedly solve the optimization problem (11) 2·(M−1)
times. Furthermore, jointly solving N equations makes
the problem even more complicated. This motivates us
to study low complexity algorithms to realize different
market equilibria in the next section.
7 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM REALIZATION
In the previous section, we characterized the necessary
and sufficient conditions of market equilibrium. In this
section, we will study which equilibrium will actually
emerge in different information scenarios.
Specifically, we consider two typical information sce-
narios: complete and incomplete information, depending
on how much network information the PUs know (see
Section 4.3 for details). Notice that in the PU-proposal
market, PUs propose offers and SUs respond by rejecting
or accepting offers. Under complete information, each
PU knows the whole network information, and can
precisely predict the SUs’ preferences. Thus, SUs cannot
mis-represent their preferences, and have to respond in
the truthful manner. That is, each SU will always accept
the best offer that brings him the maximum positive
utility. Under incomplete information, however, each PU
17. Similarly, there always exists a Pareto-optimal equilibrium
{(µn, δ∗n), ∀n} for SUs, where every SU achieves its maximum utility
among all equilibria. In addition, {(µn, δ∗n), ∀n} satisfies: δ∗n = δ∗n, ∀n.
knows only its local network information, and cannot
predict the SUs’ preferences with other PUs. Thus, SUs
can potentially mis-represent their preferences, and re-
spond in a non-truthful manner. That is, each SU may
reject the best offer that brings him the maximum posi-
tive utility, as long as such a mis-representation can bring
him a better utility.
7.1 Equilibrium under Complete Information
Under complete information, each SU has to respond in
a truthful manner, and accept the best offer that brings
him the maximum positive utility. In this sense, we can
view the SUs’ (truthful) responses as natural reactions.
Therefore, the matching problem can be viewed as an
M -player game with complete information, where game
players are PUs, whose objectives are to maximize their
own utilities. By (11), each PU’s maximal utility strictly
decreases with the utility of the matched SU. Thus, given
all other PUs’ offers (strategies), the best strategy for a
particular PU µn (i.e., the PU matched to SU n) is to
offer the lowest acceptable utility to its matched SU n,
i.e., δn = δn. This essentially lead to the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ).
Next we show how to compute the PU-Optimal-EQ
in the complete information scenario. Notice that when
µ(·) is given, the PU-Optimal-EQ can be computed by
jointly solving (15), which is complicated as mentioned
previously. Moreover, an exhaustive search of all feasible
µ(·) requires going through a total of M ! possibilities,
which has an exponential-time complexity. This makes
the solving process mathematically intractable.
To this end, we introduce a “Generalized Deferred Ac-
ceptance” (G-DAC) algorithm in Algorithm 1, which con-
verges to the PU-Optimal-EQ in polynomial-time com-
plexity. Specifically, in the G-DAC algorithm, each PU m
maintains a vector ∆m = (δm1 , ..., δmN ), which records the
utilities it is willing to offer to each SU. The basic idea
of the G-DAC algorithm is: (i) in each round, each PU
m proposes to the best SU based on ∆m, and each SU
n accepts the best proposal and rejects others; and (ii) if
PU m is rejected by SU n in a round, it increases the offer
δn by a small positive value  in the following rounds.
Algorithm 1 G-DAC
1: Initialization
2: Each PU m ∈M set δmn = 0, ∀n = 1, ..., N ;
3: do {
4: Each PU m proposes to n if fmn (δmn ) ≥ maxk{fmk (δmk ), 0};
5: Each SU n accepts the PU offering him highest utility;
6: Each PU m updates δmn = δmn +  if rejected by SU n; }
7: while (at least one δmn is changed)
The G-DAC algorithm generalizes the DAP algorithm
[15] in the following aspect. In the DAP algorithm, when
a PU is rejected by an SU, it will propose to another SU
in later rounds (as the SU who has rejected its offer will
never accept its offer in the future); while in the G-DAC
algorithm, the PU will continue to increase the utility to
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the SU (attempting to attract the SU), until the offer is
accepted by the SU or the PU can achieve a higher utility
by proposing an offer to another SU.18 Hence, it brings
an additional degree of freedom for PUs making their
decisions. Namely, each PU decides not only the target
SU that it is going to propose to, but also the utility that
it is going to transfer to the SU.
Lemma 4: The G-DAC algorithm converges to the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ), if
the stepsize  is small engouth.
To prove the above lemma, we can first show that the
convergence state of G-DAC satisfies the conditions in
Theorem 1, and is therefore an equilibrium. Then we
can prove the optimality by showing that the G-DAC
will stop at the first equilibrium it achieves, which is
exactly the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs.
Next we discuss the communication overhead and
computational complexity of the G-DAC algorithm. In
each round, each PU m needs to send one request
message to a particular SU, and each SU n needs to send
back one acceptance message to a particular PU. Thus,
the communication overhead is linear in the number of
PU-SU pairs (and hence is low). In terms of computation,
each PU m needs to solve the optimization problem (11)
at most once with complexity ρ in each round (except the
first round where the PU needs to solve the optimization
problem (11) N times with complexity Nρ), since at most
one price in the vector ∆m = (δm1 , ..., δmN ) is changed in
each round. Furthermore, each PU needs to find the max-
imal utility among N utilities, and each SU needs to find
the best offer among at most M proposals. Thus, the total
computational complexity is O(T · (Mρ+MN +NM)),
where T =
∑
n∈N δ
∗
n
 is the maximum possible iterations,
and ρ is the complexity of solving problem (11).
7.2 Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information, each SU can respond in
a non-truthful manner, and may reject the best offer that
brings him the maximum positive utility, as long as such
a mis-representation can bring a better utility for the SU.
This can be seen from the following example.
Example 2: Suppose PU µn proposes the lowest accept-
able utility to its matched SU n (as in the complete
information scenario). The SU n can simply reject this
offer (which is its best offer for SU n according to the
definition of the lowest acceptable utility), such that PU
µn increases the utility offered to SU n. 
By the above example, we can see that different mis-
representation behaviors of SUs (e.g., determining when
to accept a PU’s offer, and when to reject) may lead
to different market equilibria. Unfortunately, due to the
18. Intuitively, the G-DAC algorithm is equivalent to an English-
Auction [25] with SUs as auctioneers and PUs as bidders. The auction
works as follows: (i) each SU asks a “price” (the required utility), and
gradually increases the price if multiple PUs bid to him, and (ii) each
PU submits bid to the best SU, according to the maximum utilities that
it can achieve from SUs at the current price level of all SUs.
continuity of utility, there are infinite number of mis-
representation behaviors of SUs. Thus, it is impossible
to characterize all possible mis-representation behaviors
of SUs. To this end, we will focus on characterizing a
robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ), which pro-
vides every PU a guaranteed utility under any possible
misrepresentations of SUs.
Similarly, the robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-
EQ) can be achieved by a “Generalized Reversed Deferred
Acceptance” (G-RDAC) algorithm in Algorithm 2, which
is same as the G-DAC Algorithm 1 except that it re-
verses the roles of PUs and SUs in proposing offers.19
Since the G-DAC algorithm and G-RDAC algorithm
are symmetric, we can easily show that the G-RDAC
algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
for SUs, which is also the worst-case equilibrium for PUs.
Therefore, every PU is guaranteed to achieve a utility
no worse than that in this worst-case equilibrium, under
any possible misrepresentations of SUs. In this sense, we
refer to this worst-case equilibrium for PUs as the robust
equilibrium for PUs.
Algorithm 2 G-RDAC
1: Initialization
2: Each SU n sets pimn = 0,∀m = 1, ...,M ;
3: do {
4: Each SU n proposes m if gmn (pimn ) ≥ maxk{gkn(pikn), 0};
5: Each PU m accepts the SU offering him highest utility;
6: Each SU n updates pimn = pimn + if rejected by PU m; }
7: while (at least one pimn is changed)
7.3 Equilibrium under Arbitrary Information
It is important to note that the PU-Robust-EQ guarantees
every PU’s lowest achievable utility among all equilibria,
while the PU-Optimal-EQ ensures every PU’s highest
achievable utility among all equilibria. This implies that
under any possible equilibrium (in any information sce-
nario), every PU’s utility must be bounded by its utilities
under the PU-Robust-EQ and the PU-Optimal-EQ. Our
numerical studies in the next section further show that in
a typical market where the number of PUs and SUs are
different, the gap between the PU-Robust-EQ and the
PU-Optimal-EQ is quite small. Hence, the PU-Robust-
EQ or PU-Optimal-EQ can be viewed as an effective
approximation to understand all equilibria.
8 SIMULATION RESULTS
To highlight the performance gain achieved from coop-
erative spectrum sharing, we focus on such a network
scenario in simulations, where PUs’ direct channel gains
are much smaller than SUs’ relay channel gains. This may
happen when PUs’ direct links are highly attenuated due
to shadow fading or obstacles. This is very intuitive: only
when an SU can provide a large enough benefit to a
19. Similarly, we can show that the G-RDAC algorithm is equivalent
to an English-auction with PUs as auctioneers and SUs as bidders.
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Fig. 5. Total PUs’ utility vs Number of SUs N . The number of PUs is M = 2 in the left figure, and M = 4 in the right
figure. The PUs’ utility gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is less than 10% when M 6= N .
PU, the PU has the incentive to cooperating with the
SU, which is a prerequisite of the cooperative spectrum
sharing studied in this paper.
We distribute PUs’ and SUs’ transceiver pairs in a
square area of size 1500 × 1500m2, and set the distance
of each PU’s transceiver pair close to 1000m and the
distance of each SU’s transceiver pair close to 400m
(which are the typical transmission ranges between mo-
bile phones and cellular base stations). Unless otherwise
stated, the following default network setting will be
used: (i) Cn = Tm = 1, (ii) σ2 = −105dBm, and (iii) the
channel gains are chosen based on the free-space path
loss model in [26].
We evaluate the PUs’ performance under different
market equilibria (illustrations of equilibria can be found
in [29]). Note that the SUs’ performance can be estimated
directly from the conflicting interests between PUs and
SUs, that is, an equilibrium that is better for all PUs must
be worse for all SUs. In the following, each result is the
average of 1000 simulations with randomly generated
network topologies.
Figure 5 illusrates the PUs’ total utilities vs the num-
ber of SUs N under different market equilibria, where
the number of PUs is M = 2 in the left figure, and
M = 4 in the right figure. The red curve denotes the total
PUs’ utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ, and the blue dash
curve denotes the total PUs’ utility under the PU-Robust-
EQ. Obviously, the total PUs’ utility under any other
equilibrium is bounded by these two curves.
From Figure 5, we can see that the PUs’ total utility
under equilibrium increases with the number of SUs N
(as the competition among SUs increases with N ), and
decreases with the number of PUs M (as the competition
among PUs increases with M ). Moreover, when M < N ,
PUs can extract most of the generated utility (as the
competition among SUs is more intense), and when
M > N , SUs can extract most of the generated utility (as
the competition among PUs is more intense). We further
have the following observations.
(1) In the general case where the numbers of PUs and
SUs are different (i.e., M 6= N ), the utility gap between
PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g.,
less than 10% in both figures). This implies that the
information scenario (i.e., the amount of network infor-
mation that PUs know) has a small impact on the market
equilibrium.
(2) In the special case where the numbers of PUs and
SUs are identical (i.e., M = N ), the utility gap between
PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is large. This implies
that the information scenario has a significant impact on
the market equilibrium.
Intuitively, when N 6= M , the imbalance of competi-
tion among PUs and among SUs reduces the effect of
information incompleteness. The reason is as follows. If
the number of SUs is larger than that of PUs (N > M ),
the intensified competition among SUs pushes SUs to
reveal their preferences close to the true values. If the
number of PUs is larger than that of SUs (M > N ), the
intensified competition among PUs already drives most
of the generated welfare to the SU-side even in the worst-
case equilibrium for SUs, and thus the SUs’ performance
gain in other equilibria is small. When M = N , however,
none of the two sides has a dominated competition level
in the market, thus the effect of information incomplete-
ness becomes significant.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum shar-
ing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs using the
matching theory. We formulate the problem as a two-
sided matching market, and characterize the market
equilibrium systematically. We further study which equi-
librium will actually emerge in both complete and in-
complete information scenarios. Our study can facilitate
the design of large networks, in which players can be
split into two different types, interacting with each other.
The interaction between players is not restricted within
the cooperative spectrum sharing studied in this work,
but can be quite general (e.g., spectrum trading). There
are some possible directions to extend the results in this
paper. An interesting direction is to consider a more gen-
eral cooperative spectrum sharing protocol where each
PU can cooperate with multiple SUs to relay its traffic,
and each SU can cooperates with multiple PUs to access
their spectrum. In this case, the resulting matching is no
longer a one-to-one correspondence between PUs and
SUs, but a multiple-to-multiple correspondence between
PUs and SUs.
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APPENDIX
Outline of this appendix:
• A. Strongly Incomplete Information
• B. Illustrations of Equilibria in Simulations
• C. Implementation Issues
• D. Equilibrium Analysis for the Simplified Model
• E. Proof for Theorem 1
• F. Proof for Lemma 3
• G. Proof for Theorem 2
A. Strongly Incomplete Information
In the main manuscript, we have studied the complete
information and incomplete information scenarios. Now
we consider the strongly incomplete information sce-
nario, where each PU only knows its own channel and
relay channel information, but not SUs’ channel infor-
mation. In this case, each PU does not have enough in-
formation to solve the optimization problem (11), even if
it knows the reservation utility of its matched SU. Thus,
we need to consider not only the mis-representations of
SUs, but also the proposing rule with which PUs can
calculate the desired offers to SUs.
To this end, we will first design a proposing rule for PUs
based on their “guesses” about SUs’ information. Then
we will study the incentive for SUs to truthfully repre-
sent their preferences under the new proposing rule, and
characterize the corresponding equilibrium.
The basic idea of the guess-based proposing rule is as
follows. First, each PU m guesses the necessary infor-
mation (called type) about every SU, and proposes an
offer aiming at extracting the entire cooperation gain from
an SU with the guessed information.20 If it is rejected by an
SU, the PU updates its guess about this SU, and propose
a new offer (aiming at extracting the entire cooperation
gain from the SU with the updated guess).
To capture the key information that PU m wants to
know about SUs, we introduce the concept of type for
each SU m, denoted by Hmn and defined as
Hmn = 2 · Rn(m)−CnCnTm .
Notice that Hmn captures all of the key information of SU
n (for PU m). With the type Hmn , the SU’s utility defined
in (8) can be rewritten as
∆mn = (t
m
n ·Hmn − pmn ) ·A, (16)
where A , CnTm2·(Tm+tmn ) is a constant.
By (16), we can easily find that to ask for a relay power
pmn from SU n, PU m has to reward an access time no
smaller than tmn · Hmn to SU n (otherwise SU n will get
a negative utility, and thus will never accept the offer).
Obviously, PU m is able to derive the optimal proposing
rule to SU n from (11) only if it knows the real type
20. Note that we can neither prove the optimality of this proposing
rule, nor find another rule always better than this one. Nevertheless,
through simulations we can see that the PUs’ performances with this
proposing rule are very closed to those with optimal proposing rule
(11) under weakly incomplete information.
Hmn . In this scenario, however, PU m cannot obtain the
real type Hmn of SU n, since it does not know the direct
channel gain Gn(m) of SU n.
Let us denote H˜mn as the PU m’s guess about the SU
n’s real type Hmn . With this guess H˜mn , PU m aims at
extracting all the cooperation gain from SU n, i.e.,
Π˜m∗n = max{pmn ,tmn }
Πmn (p
m
n , t
m
n )
s.t. pmn = t
m
n · H˜mn .
(17)
The constraint in (17) shows that (i) if Hmn = H˜mn
(i.e., the guessed SU type is exactly same as the true
SU type), then SU n will achieve a zero utility from
the PU m’s proposed offer given by (17), and (ii) if
Hmn > H˜
m
n (or Hmn < H˜mn ), then SU n can achieve a
positive (or negative) utility from the PU m’s proposed
offer. Thus, under this guess-based proposing rule, SU n
will accept (or reject) the PU m’s offer only if its real type
Hmn is larger (or smaller) than the PU m’s guess H˜mn . In
addition, when accepting the PU’s offer (i.e., Hmn > H˜mn ),
SU n’s actual utility is
∆˜m∗n =
tm∗n ·(Rn−Cn)−pm∗n ·CnTm2
Tm+tm∗n
= CnTm2 · t
m∗
n
Tm+tm∗n
· (Hmn − H˜mn ),
(18)
where tm∗n and pm∗n are the optimal solution to (17).
Note that Π˜m∗n , ∆˜m∗n , tm∗n , and pm∗n are all functions
of H˜mn . Thus, (17) and (18) define an implicit function
between Π˜m∗n and ∆˜m∗n . Similar to the Utility Transfer
Function (UTF) defined in (11), we define a Guess-
based Utility Transferring Function (GS-UTF), denoted by
Π˜m∗n , f˜mn (∆˜m∗n ). It is easy to check that Π˜m∗n strictly
increases with H˜mn , and ∆˜m∗n strictly decreases with H˜mn .
Thus, f˜mn (∆˜m∗n ) is a strictly decreasing function of ∆˜m∗n .
Figure 6 in Section 8 illustrates this guess-based utility
transferring function.
Notice that all results based on UTF in Section 6.A-D
can be directly applied to the model based on GS-UTF
here. Specifically, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for an equilibrium can be characterized by Theorem 1
(by simply replacing all involved UTF functions into
the GS-UTF functions). The optimality of equilibrium
can be proved by a similar Lattice theorem in Lemma
3. Note that here the “optimality” refers to the optimal
equilibrium restricted within the above guess-based propos-
ing rule, but not the globally optimal equilibrium in
all possible proposing rules. As mentioned previously,
it is challenging to characterize the globally optimal
equilibrium.
Similarly, we can obtain a lower-bound equilibrium
(in terms of PUs’ utilities) by a “Guess-based Gener-
alized Reversed Deferred Acceptance” procedure (GSG-
RDAC), which is the same as the G-RDAC except the
utility transferring function. The details of the GSG-
RDAS is skipped due to the space limit. We referred
to the equilibrium resulting from the GSG-RDAC as
PU-Pessimistic-EQ-GS. Obviously, PU-Pessimistic-EQ-GS
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guarantees the worst-case utility of every PU, with the
above guess-based proposing rule, under all possible
mis-representations of SUs.
B. Illustrations of Equilibria in Simulations
Now we illustrate the equilibria (i.e., utility division and
relay assignment) in simulations.
(1) Utility Division under Equilibrium
We first illustrate the utility division (or equivalently, re-
source exchange) under market equilibria to provide an
illustrative impression on the market equilibrium.
Figure 6 illustrates the utility transfer functions (UTF)
and the associated equilibrium utility division in the
network with (i) one PU {m} and two SUs {n1, n2} (left
figure) and (ii) two PUs {m1,m2} and one SU {n} (right
figure). Recall that the UTF function represents how
a PU’s maximal utility changes with the utility of the
matched SU. In the left figure, we choose the symmetric
topology for the PU and two SUs (with G2m = −110dBm,
G2n(m) = G
2
m,n = G
2
n,m = −90dBm, n ∈ {n1, n2}) and
different energy costs for two SUs (with Cn1 = 1 and
Cn2 = 2). In this case, PU m is matched to SU n1 under
the market equilibrium. In the right figure, we choose
different topologies for the SU and two PUs (with G2m1 =−110dBm, G2m2 = −100dBm, G2n(m) = G2m,n = G2n,m =
−90dBm, m ∈ {m1,m2}). In this case, SU n is matched
to PU m1 under the market equilibrium. In both figures,
the equilibrium utility division among the matched PU
and SU is illustrated by the black bold line (between
the circle and the square). More specifically, the circle
denotes the utility division under the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ), and the square
denotes the utility division under the Robust equilibrium
for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ). More detailed explanations for
these equilibria are given below.
(1) PU-Optimal-EQ in the left of Figure 6: The PU-
Optimal-EQ can be achieved by offering the lowest ac-
ceptable utility (i.e., zero in this example) to SU n1.
Obviously, the PU achieves its maximum utility under
PU-Optimal-EQ among all equilibria.
(2) PU-Robust-EQ in the left of Figure 6: The PU-
Robust-EQ can be achieved by offering the highest
achievable utility (i.e., 0.5 in this example) to SU n1. Note
that due to the competition among SUs, SU n1 cannot
requesting a utility higher than 0.5 from the PU (which
will leave the PU a utility lower than 0.8), otherwise,
SU n2 can successfully pair with the PU by requesting a
utility slightly higher than zero (which will leave the PU
a utility of 0.8). This implies that the PU is guaranteed
to obtain a utility of 0.8 (i.e., that under PU-Robust-EQ).
(3) PU-Optimal-EQ in the right of Figure 6: The PU-
Optimal-EQ can be achieved when PU m1 offers the
lowest acceptable utility (i.e., 1.7 in this example) to SU
n. Note that due to the competition among PUs, PU m1
cannot offer a utility lower than 1.7 to SU n, otherwise,
PU m2 can offer a utility of 1.7 to SU n such that SU n
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Fig. 7. Relay Assignment under Market Equilibrium. Each
PU i is matched to SU i. The value associated with each
PTi (or STi) denote PU i’s (or SU i’s) utilities under PU-
Optimal-EQ (blue) and PU-Robust-EQ (red), respectively.
accepts the offer of PU m2. Similarly, PU m1 achieves its
maximum utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ among all
equilibria.21
(4) PU-Robust-EQ in the right of Figure 6: The PU-
Robust-EQ can be achieved when PU m1 offers the
highest achievable utility (i.e., 2.2 in this example) to
SU n. Note that PU m1 will never offer a utility higher
than 2.2 to SU n, otherwise, it will achieve a negative
utility. Therefore, the PU-Robust-EQ provides PU m1 a
guaranteed utility of zero.
From Figure 6, we can also see that the PUs’ and SUs’
equilibrium utilities are greatly affected by the numbers
of PUs and SUs. Specifically, when the number of PUs
is smaller than that of SUs (left figure), the PU is likely
to achieve a large utility under the market equilibrium,
benefiting from the competition of SUs. When the num-
ber of PUs is larger than that of SUs (right figure), the
PUs are likely to achieve small utilities under the market
equilibrium, suffering from the competition of PUs. Later
in Figure 5 we will show this observation more explicitly.
(2) Relay Assignment under Equilibrium
Now we illustrate the relay assignment under the market
equilibrium. To provide a clear impression, we simulate
a network with 4 PUs and 4 SUs shown in Figure
7, where primary receivers (PRs) are co-located at the
middle of the area (denoted by the trangle), and primary
transmitters (PTs) are located close to the edges of the
area (denoted by squares). We use the default network
setting except the channel gains, which are derived by
the free-space path loss model in [26].
Figure 7 illustrates the network topology and the
associated relay assignment (i.e., PU-SU matching) un-
der the market equilibrium. In this example, SU i is
assigned to relay for PU i, ∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4, under the
market equilibrium. Note that PUs’ and SUs’ utilities are
different under different market equilibria. The values
associated with each PTi (or STi) denote PU i’s (or SU
21. Note PU m2 achieves a zero utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ.
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Fig. 6. Utility Division under Market Equilibrium. Left: one PU {m} and two SUs {n1, n2}. PU m is matched to SU n1
under the market equilibrium. Right: two PUs {m1,m2} and one SU {n}. SU n is matched to PU m1 under the market
equilibrium. The equilibrium utility division among the matched PU and SU is illustrated by the black bold line.
i’s) utilities under the PU-Optimal-EQ (blue) and the
PU-Robust-EQ (red), respectively. Specifically, under the
PU-Optimal-EQ, PUs’ utilities are {0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, and
SUs’ utilities are {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0}; Under the PU-Robust-
EQ, PUs’ utilities are {0.3, 0, 0.2, 0}, and SUs’ utilities
are {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.3}. Detailed discussions about such a
utility difference are given below.
(1) PU 4 and SU 4: PU 4 and SU 4 are far apart from
other users, and their interaction will be slightly affected
by others’ interactions. Thus, under the PU-Optimal-EQ,
SU 4 will achieve the lowest acceptable utility (i.e., 0).
Under the PU-Robust-EQ, SU 4 will achieve the highest
acceptable utility (i.e., 0.3), and PU 4 can only achieve a
zero utility.
(2) PUs 1 and 3: PU 1 is close to SUs {1, 2, 3}, and can
potentially cooperate with these SUs. Thus, SUs {1, 2, 3}
will compete with each for PU 1. Similar to the left figure
of Figure 6, the PU can achieve a high utility (i.e., 0.3)
under the (worst-case) robust equilibrium PU-Robust-
EQ, benefiting from the competition of SUs. Similarly,
PU 3 can potentially cooperate with multiple SUs {1, 3},
and thus will also achieve a high utility (i.e., 0.2) under
the PU-Robust-EQ.
C. Implementation Issues
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the implementation
issues of the proposed cooperative sharing scheme.
We first discuss how PUs obtain information in dif-
ferent information scenarios. As shown in Section 4.3,
we consider two information scenarios: complete and
incomplete information. First, complete information is an
ideal benchmark (though not practical) case, where PUs
know everything about the network. Second, incomplete
information is a more practical case, where each PU
knows only the local information, including its own
channel gain, its relay channel gains (with neighboring
SUs), and the neighboring SUs’ channel gains. The first
class of local information can be easily obtained via
measuring the average Received Signal Strength (RSS)
from the PU’s transmitter to receiver. The second class
of local information can be obtained via measuring
the average RSS from SUs’s transmitters to the PU’s
transmitter and receiver, respectively. The third class
of local information (i.e., SUs’ channel gains), however,
cannot be measured by the PU directly. Nevertheless,
by measuring the average RSS from a SU’s transmitter
to the PU’s transmitter and receiver jointly, the PU can
estimate the SU transmitter’s location (i.e., obtaining
two candidate points); with the similar method, the PU
can estimate the SU receiver’s location (i.e., obtaining
two candidate points). Hence, there are at most four
possibilities for an SU’s topology. With certain additional
knowledge (e.g., historical information or SU report), the
PU can derive the exact topology of the SU, and further
calculate the SU’s average channel gain.22
We then discuss the time synchronization, which is
a very important implementation issue. In the existing
literature of cooperative communications, researchers
have proposed many techniques to address this issue
(see, e.g., [27]). In our model, we would like to clarify
that we do not require all PUs and SUs to be fully
synchronized during the whole interaction period. As in
many existing literature (e.g., [8]-[14]), we assume that
there exists a common control channel for the necessary
communications and interactions between PUs and SUs.
Namely, PUs and SUs transmit all of the control signals
(e.g., beacon, PU proposal, and SU response) on the
common control channel using certain multiple access
method such as CDMA, and continuously monitor the
common control channel to decode the desired con-
trol signals. Hence, PUs and SUs can interact (on the
common control channel) in the asynchronous manner
during the matching period (i.e., in the processing of
Algorithms 2 and 3); when a stable matching is reached
(i.e., after the convergence of Algorithms 2 and 3), each
pair of matched PU and SU then operate (on the PU’s
operating channel) in the synchronous manner during
22. It is important to note that such an estimation is based on
assumption that there is no deep fading or shadowing between the
SU’s transmitter and receiver, hence the channel gain is determined
by the transmission distance only. Otherwise, the PU may not be
able to estimate the SU’s own channel gain correctly. In that case, the
estimation will be based on the SU’s report directly.
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their cooperative transmission period (Phases I and II)
and secondary transmission period (Phase III). Such a
synchronization (among a pair of matched PU and SU
in Phases I, II, and III) can be achieved using different
methods in the existing cooperative communication lit-
erature (e.g., [27]).
D. Equilibrium Analysis for the Simplified Model
Now we provide the complete equilibrium analysis for
the simplified model.
(1) Common & Conflicting Interests on Equilibrium
By Example 1, we can find that there exists a unique
Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs: µa, where every PU
achieves a no worse utility than in any other equilibrium.
Similarly, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilib-
rium for SUs: µc, where every SU achieves a no worse
utility than in any other equilibrium. Lemma 5 shows
that this observation is generally applicable.
Lemma 5 (Optimality): There always exists a unique
Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs, where every PU
achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria. Sim-
ilarly, there always exists a unique Pareto-optimal equi-
librium for SUs, where every SU achieves its maximum
utility among all equilibria.
The following lemma further shows that among any
two equilibria, the equilibrium that is better for all users
on one side is always worse for all users on the other
side.
Lemma 6 (Conflicting Interest): For any equilibria µ and
µ′, all PUs prefer µ to µ′, if and only if all SUs prefer µ′
to µ.
Lemmas 5 and 6 show that users on the same side
have a common interest and users on the opposite sides
have conflicting interests, regarding the set of equilibria.23
(2) Equilibrium under Complete Information
Now we study which equilibrium will actually emerge
(in the PU-proposal market) under complete informa-
tion. In this case, any SU’s misrepresentation (of its
preference list) is not allowed, as PUs know the whole
network information and thus know the complete pref-
erence lists of SUs.
We first introduce the “deferred acceptance” (DAC) al-
gorithm in [15], and then show in Lemma 7 the DAC
algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ).
Algorithm 3 DAC
1: while (at least one PU is rejected in previous round) do {
2: Each PU proposes to the first SU in its preference list;
3: Each SU rejects all proposals but the most preferred;
4: Each PU updates the preference list by removing the SU
who just rejected him; }
23. This observation was first discovered by Gale and Shapley in
[15]. The detailed proof can also be referred to [15].
Lemma 7: The DAC algorithm converges the Pareto-
optimal equilibrium for PUs, i.e., PU-Optimal-EQ.
Notice that every PU can achieve a better utility under
the PU-Optimal-EQ than under any other equilibrium.
That is, there does not exist another equilibrium, in
which at least one PU achieves a higher utility than in the
PU-Optimal-EQ. Thus, all PUs are willing to follow the
proposing rule in the DAC algorithm in order to achieve
the PU-Optimal-EQ. This implies that the PU-Optimal-EQ
is the only equilibrium that will emerge under complete
information.
(3) Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Now let us consider the incomplete information sce-
nario, where PUs know their local network information
only, and thus cannot know the complete preference lists
of SUs. Therefore, it is possible for SUs to misrepresent
their preference lists to seek more utilities. We show this
by the following example.
Example 3: Consider the same model in Example 1,
except that here each PU does not know SUs’ preference
lists. Suppose SU n1 misrepresents its preferences by
Q(n1) = {m2,m3}. Then it is easy to check that the DAC
algorithm will lead to the equilibrium µb. Furthermore,
if SU n1 misrepresents its preferences by Q(n1) = {m2},
then the DAC algorithm will lead to the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium µc for SUs. In both misrepresentations, SU
n1 achieves a higher utility than truth-telling. 
By the above example, we can see that different
misrepresentation behaviors of SUs may lead to differ-
ent market equilibria. Unfortunately, characterizing all
misrepresentation behaviors of SUs in the incomplete
information scenario is an NP-hard problem. Hence, it is
difficult to characterize which specific equilibrium will
actually emerge in the incomplete information scenario,
due to the uncertainty of SU misrepresentation. To this
end, we study the worst-case equilibrium for PUs, and
characterize a robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-
EQ), which gives every PU a guaranteed utility under
any possible misrepresentations of SUs.
Specifically, the robust equilibrium PU-Robust-EQ can
be achieved by a “reversed deferred acceptance” (RDAC)
algorithm as in [15], which is same as the DAC algorithm
except that it reverses the roles of PUs and SUs in
proposing offers. That is, in the RDAC algorithm, each
SU proposes to its most preferred PU among those who
have not yet rejected him, and each PU accepts the most
preferred proposal and rejects the others. The details of
the RDAC algorithm are skipped due to space limit. By
the symmetry between two algorithms, the RDAC algo-
rithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for
SUs, which, by Lemma 6, is the worst-case equilibrium
for PUs. Therefore, every PU is guaranteed to achieve a
utility no worse than that in this worst-case equilibrium,
under any possible misrepresentations of SUs. In this
sense, we refer to this worst-case equilibrium for PUs as
the robust equilibrium for PUs.
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E. Proof for Theorem 1
We have already shown the necessity by the above
analysis. Next we prove the sufficiency.
We first show that such a matching does not violate
any PU or SU’s IR condition. This is because each SU n
gets a utility δn ≥ δn ≥ 0 and each PU m gets a utility
fµnn (δn) ≥ fµnn (δn) ≥ fµnn (gµnn (0)) = 0. By (11), we can
further show that each pair of matched PU µn and SU
n have no incentive to change δn, otherwise at least one
user will lose certain utility (since an increase of one’s
utility will lead to a decrease of another’s utility).
We then show that no PU or SU will deviate from
the current matching by choosing a different partner. We
prove this by contradiction. Suppose that both PU µn
(who is currently matched to SU n) and SU k 6= n have
incentives to break the matching by pairing up with each
other. Then there must exist a value δ′k such that (i) δ
′
k >
δk (i.e., SU k achieves a larger utility with PU µn) and (ii)
fµnk (δ
′
k) > f
µn
n (δn) (i.e., PU µn achieves a larger utility
with SU k). On the other hand, we have
fµnn (δn) ≥ fµnk (δk) > fµnk (δ′k),
where the first inequality follows directly from δn ≤ δn,
and the second inequality follows from the assumption
δ′k > δk. This leads to a contradiction.
F. Proof for Lemma 3
To prove {(µn, δXn ),∀n} is an equilibrium, we only need
to show that δXn satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1.
By Theorem 1, we have: for all n ∈ N ,
δin ≤ δin ≤ δ
i
n, i = I, II.
Without loss of generality, we consider an arbitrary
matching pair, say, PU µn and SU n. Suppose δIn ≤ δIIn .
Then δXn = min(δIn, δIIn ) = δIn. On one hand,
δXn = δ
I
n ≥ δIn = max
m 6=µn
{
gmn
(
fmµm(δ
I
µm)
)
, 0
}
≥ max
m6=µn
{
gmn
(
fmµm(δ
X
µm)
)
, 0
}
, δXn .
The second line follows because gmn
(
fmµm(·)
)
is an increas-
ing function, and δXµm ≤ δIµm ,∀µm. On the other hand,
δXn = min
{
δIn, δ
II
n
} ≤ min{δIn, δIIn }
= min
k 6=n
{
gµnn
(
fµnk (δ
I
k)
)
, gµnn
(
fµnk (δ
II
k )
)
, gµnn (0)
}
= min
k 6=n
{
gµnn
(
fµnk (min(δ
I
k, δ
II
k ))
)
, gµnn (0)
}
, δXn .
The last line follows because h(·) , gµnn
(
fµnk (·)
)
is an
increasing function, thus min(h(x), h(y)) = h(min(x, y)).
G. Proof for Theorem 2
The existence and uniqueness of PU-optimal equilibrium
can be easily proved by iteratively applying Lemma 3 on
any two equilibria. Next we prove that the PU-optimal
equilibrium {(µn, δ∗n),∀n} satisfies the conditions: δ∗n =
δ∗n,∀n. If not, there must exist some n such that δ∗n > δ∗n,
and δ∗n can be further reduced without affecting the
IC and IR conditions for equilibrium. Obviously, this
violates the optimality of {(µn, δ∗n),∀n}.
